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Abstract
Anonymity means that the identity of the user performing a certain action is maintained secret. The
protocols for ensuring anonymity often use random mechanisms which can be described probabilistically.
The user, on the other hand, may be selected either nondeterministically or probabilistically. We inves-
tigate various notions of anonymity, at diﬀerent levels of strength, for both the cases of probabilistic and
nondeterministic users. Probabilistic process algebra have been of great help in the development of our
setting.
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Anonymity is the property of keeping secret the identity of the user performing
a certain action. The need for anonymity may raise in a wide range of situations,
like postings on electronic forums, voting, delation, donations, and many others.
The protocols for ensuring anonymity often use random mechanisms which can
be described probabilistically. This is the case, for example, of the Dining Cryptog-
raphers [3], Crowds [7], and Onion Routing [11]. In contrast, we usually don’t know
anything about the users, so their behavior, and in particular, the choice of the user
who performs the action with respect to which we want to ensure anonymity, should
better be regarded as nondeterministic. (The same would hold for adversaries, al-
though in this paper we do not consider them.) The whole system constituted by the
protocol and the users presents therefore both probabilistic and nondeterministic
aspects.
Various formal deﬁnitions and frameworks for analyzing anonymity have been
developed in literature. They can be classiﬁed into approaches based on process-
calculi [9,8], epistemic logic [10,5], and “function views” [6]. From the point of view
of the concepts of probability and nondeterminism, however, all these approaches are
either purely nondeterministic (also known as possibilistic) or purely probabilistic.
1 This work has been partially supported by the Project Rossignol of the ACI Se´curite´ Informatique (Min-
iste`re de la recherche et nouvelles technologies).
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The purely nondeterministic approach in [9,8] is based on the so-called “prin-
ciple of confusion”: a system is anonymous if the set of the possible outcomes is
saturated with respect to the intended anonymous users, i.e. if one such user can
cause a certain observable trace in one possible computation, then there must be
alternative computations in which each other anonymous user can give rise to the
same observable trace (modulo the identity of the anonymous users).
The purely probabilistic proposals can be classiﬁed under two diﬀerent points of
view: those which focus on the probability of the users, and those which focus on
the eﬀect that the observables have on the probability of the users. The distinction
is subtle but fundamental. In the ﬁst case, anonymity holds when (an observer
knows that) all users have the same probability of having performed the action (cfr.
strong probabilistic anonymity in [5]). In the second case, it holds when the for any
user i and any observable o the conditional probability that i has performed the
action, given the observable, is the same as the (a priory) probability that the user
has performed the action (cfr. the informal notion used in [3], and the conditional
probabilistic anonymity in [5]).
The probabilistic approach also brings naturally to diﬀerentiate the notion of
anonymity with respect to diﬀerent levels of strength. Reiter and Robin [7] have
proposed the following hierarchy:
Beyond suspicion The actual user (i.e. the user that performed the action) is not
more likely (to have performed the action) than every other user.
Probable innocence The actual user has probability less than 1/2.
Possible innocence There is a non trivial probability that another used could have
performed the action.
These notions were only given informally in [7], and it is unclear to us whether the
authors had in mind the ﬁrst or the second of the “points of view” described above.
On one hand, if we interpret the informal deﬁnitions literally, they correspond to
the ﬁrst point of view. This is the interpretation given by Halpern and O’Neill in
[5]: they characterize probable innocence and possible innocence with the notion
of (probabilistic) α-anonymity, and beyond suspicion with their notion of strong
probabilistic anonymity. On the other hand, the result of probable innocence proved
in [7] for Crowds does not seem to ﬁt with this interpretation, while it could ﬁt with
a suitable weakening of the anonymity notion illustrated above under the second
perspective (i.e. what Halpern and O’Neill call conditional probabilistic anonymity).
In our approach we assume that the users may be nondeterministic, i.e. that
nothing may be known about the relative frequency by which each user perform
the anonymous action. More precisely, the users can in principle be totally unpre-
dictable and change intention every time, so that their behavior cannot be thought
of as probabilistic 2 . The internal mechanisms of the systems, on the contrary, like
coin tossing in the dining philosophers, or the random selection of a nearby node
2 In the areas of concurrency theory there has been a long-standing discussion on whether nondeterminism
can be thought of as a situation in which the probabilities are unknown and can change very time the
experiment is repeated. Nowadays the prevailing opinion, which we share, is that nondetermistism is a
diﬀerent notion. In the formalisms used in concurrency the diﬀerence is made explicit by diﬀerent laws.
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in Crowds, are supposed to exhibit a certain regularity and obey a probabilistic
distribution. Correspondingly, we explore a notion of probabilistic anonymity that
focuses on the internal mechanism of the system, i.e. their non-leakage of proba-
bilistic information, and it is in a sense independent from the users in case they
are nondeterministic. The counterpart of our deﬁnition in the case the users are
probabilistic (with possibly unknown probabilities), can be shown to correspond to
a generalized version of Halpern and O’Neill’s conditional probabilistic anonymity,
where “generalized” here means that the anonymity holds for any probability dis-
tribution to the users.
The formalism that we use for the description and the analysis of the anonymity
protocols is a process algebra with both nondeterministic and probabilistic choice.
This kind of process algebra constitute a rich framework that allows describing a
variety of phenomena, from concurrent and distributed systems to security protocols
which involve random primitives. Despite the fact that this subject is relatively
recent and its theoretical foundations are still under development, it has been of
great help in this project: once the protocols have been expressed in the familiar
formalism of process algebra, the author has got a much better understanding of
the concept of (probabilistic) anonymity, and the the development of the formal
setting has been a quite natural process.
This abstract is based on the papers [1], [2] and [4].
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